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Social security in the aftermath 
of the EU referendum
Should the UK leave the 
EU, the imposition of 
retrospective changes 
to the rights of existing 
EU/EEA benefit claimants 
would almost certainly 
result in a wave of legal 
challenges.
Richard Machin
Richard Machin gives an overview of what 
might happen to social security benefits 
whether UK citizens vote to leave or stay in 
the EU.
threshold has been introduced to ascertain if a 
worker or self-employed person is in ‘genuine 
and effective’ employment. EEA jobseekers 
are now prevented from claiming housing 
benefit (even if they are in receipt of JSA) and 
are prevented from accessing universal credit. 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
statistics (Statistics on migrants and benefits, 
Briefing Paper no CBP 7445, 8 February 2016) 
show a significant increase in the number of 
working-age EU benefit claimants between 
2008 and 2015 (65,090 to 113,960). However, 
in 2015 EU nationals accounted for only 2.2 per 
cent of working-age benefit claims (compared 
with 92.8 per cent for UK citizens and 5 per 
cent for non-EU foreign nationals).
The government perhaps felt a vindication 
for these changes following the decision of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in Dano and Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig 
Case C-333/13, 11 November 2014 (see Free 
Movement blog entry by Desmond Rutledge, 
‘Dano and the exclusion of inactive EU 
citizens from certain non-contributory social 
benefits’, 19 November 2014). Ms Dano was 
an economically inactive Romanian national 
who was judged to have moved to Germany 
to access social assistance. In handing down 
its judgment, the CJEU held that member 
states can refuse to award welfare benefits to 
migrants who are economically inactive.
Impact of exit from EU on welfare benefits
If the UK leaves the EU, it will need to inform 
the European Council and the terms of the 
withdrawal will need to be negotiated within 
a two-year period. As with all aspects of the 
EU debate, hugely contrasting opinions have 
been offered on whether two years is a realistic 
timescale to secure an exit. 
The structure of the social security system 
following an EU exit would largely depend on 
whether withdrawal resulted in the end of the 
right to free movement. The removal of the 
right to free movement would allow the UK 
to impose tight restrictions on entitlement to 
social security benefits for EU/EEA nationals 
(this would require Immigration Act 1988 
s7(1) to be repealed). Amendments could be 
made to immigration law to specify that leave 
to remain in the UK is subject to an EU/EEA 
national having no recourse to public funds. 
Restrictions to in-work benefits could be 
achieved by limiting access to employment. 
Difficult decisions would need to be made 
about transitional protection for existing EU/
EEA nationals resident in the UK at the point 
of withdrawal and the acquired rights of 
 he American writer Tom Peters  
 said: ‘If you’re not confused, you’re 
not paying attention.’ This adage rings true 
when listening to claim and counter-claim 
about the impact of the UK’s  EU membership 
(currently an economic and political union 
of 28 countries). We are certainly not short of 
wildly differing economic forecasts, statistics, 
and legal and political opinions on Brexit.  
The decision in the EU referendum on 23 June 
will be of huge significance for professionals 
and clients in the social welfare law sector,  
with a key area being social security. EU 
withdrawal would affect eligibility to welfare 
benefits for UK-resident EU nationals, UK-
resident nationals of the European Economic 
Area (EEA, the 28 EU countries plus 
T
Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway), and UK 
nationals living in other EU and EEA countries.
Current welfare benefit entitlement for 
EU/EEA nationals living in the UK
Entitlement to welfare benefits for those 
moving between EU member states is 
inextricably linked to one of the key principles 
of the EU: free movement of people. Free 
movement for EU citizens does not equate 
to unrestricted access to benefits in the host 
country. Over the past few years, the UK 
government has restricted benefit entitlement 
for EEA migrants. Government policy has 
been influenced by changes to EU legislation, 
case law and the enlargement of the EU. 
This complex interplay of both domestic 
and European law is underpinned by a 
commitment by all EU member states to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). The TFEU sets out the right to 
free movement, non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality and freedom to establish 
self-employment (arts 18, 20–21 and 49–53). 
Policy-makers must be mindful of these 
measures; however, in social security terms 
they only apply to claimants who can prove 
they are economically active and/or able to 
support themselves.
Since January 2014, the UK government 
has introduced a range of measures intended 
to reduce entitlement to social security 
benefits for EEA nationals (January 2014 was 
a significant date as this saw the lifting of 
transitional restrictions on the right to work in 
the UK for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals). 
The prime minister believes that changes were 
necessary ‘to ensure our welfare system is not 
taken advantage of’ (Measures to limit migrants’ 
access to benefits, Briefing Paper no 06889, 
17 June 2015). Specific measures included 
implementing a three-month waiting period 
for people entering the UK before they could 
claim income-based jobseeker’s allowance 
(JSA), child benefit and/or child tax credit. EEA 
jobseekers and former workers must show that 
they have a ‘genuine prospect’ of finding work 
to continue claiming JSA. A minimum earnings 
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those who have gained permanent residence. 
Transitional protection of EU/EEA nationals 
already exercising their rights under the TFEU 
(particularly those who are economically 
active) would effectively result in the current 
arrangements, described above, continuing for 
many EU/EEA benefit claimants far beyond 
an exit date. The imposition of retrospective 
changes to the rights of existing EU/EEA 
benefit claimants would almost certainly 
result in a wave of legal challenges (see EU Law 
Analysis blog entry by Helena Wray (posted 
by Steve Peers), ‘What would happen to EU 
nationals living or planning to visit or live in the 
UK after a UK exit from the EU?’, 17 July 2014).
The ending of the right to free movement 
would mean the current EU social security co-
ordination rules (as laid out in Regulations (EC) 
No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009) would 
not apply. The co-ordination rules provide a set 
of legal principles that member states should 
follow but fall short of requiring uniformity 
of benefit rules and eligibility across the EU. 
However, following an EU exit, the UK would 
be free to enact social security legislation 
without reference to EU co-ordination rules, 
which currently stipulate that discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality is forbidden.
In place of the EU co-ordination rules, 
the UK government could seek to make 
bilateral agreements with individual European 
countries. This model is considered in a 
government paper published in March 2016, 
Alternatives to membership: possible models 
for the United Kingdom outside the European 
Union. Switzerland is cited as an example 
of a country that has negotiated bilateral 
agreements with other nations on a wide 
range of issues. Clearly, the government 
does not want to promote alternatives to EU 
membership as attractive or viable options. 
However, it is interesting that, with reference 
to Switzerland, it comments: ‘Over the last 
two decades, it has painstakingly negotiated 
over 100 individual agreements with the EU’ 
(para 3.27, p26). Any negotiations would be 
influenced by the relationships the UK has 
with other nations. Reciprocal arrangements 
would presumably be based on the number 
of UK nationals living in the country with 
which the negotiation was taking place, 
alongside perceptions of UK immigration and 
social security legislation. Striking mutually 
acceptable partnership agreements with 
countries that fundamentally oppose a UK exit 
from the EU may prove problematic. The UK 
already has a number of bilateral social security 
agreements in place with non-EEA states (eg 
Jamaica and the USA) and these would perhaps 
provide a blueprint for future deals. Typically, 
they focus on reciprocal acknowledgment 
of insurance contributions for contributory 
benefits, allow benefits to be exported 
between partner countries, and agree annual 
uprating. Note, though, that existing bilateral 
agreements are more limited and less generous 
than current provisions under EU law.
An alternative to the bilateral agreement 
model (which might be easier to negotiate but 
would almost certainly be less attractive to 
‘leave’ campaigners) would be for the UK to 
negotiate an EU-wide deal. This might replicate 
the position of Norway, which is a member 
of the EEA but not the EU (and is obliged 
to accept the free movement of citizens). 
Complications around individual agreements 
would be avoided but it seems inconceivable 
that the EU would accept any arrangement 
that discriminated against individual member 
states (including the poorest). The ‘leave’ 
campaign clearly views freedom of movement 
as one of the pitfalls of EU membership, 
believing it ‘stops us controlling who comes 
into our country, on what terms, and who 
can be removed’ (The EU immigration system 
is immoral and unfair, Vote Leave, 2016). On 
the other hand, free movement rights are 
viewed as sacrosanct by the EU. Norway’s 
position in Europe is interesting as the right 
to free movement has resulted in more than 
six per cent of the population being from EU 
countries (Alternatives to membership, para 
3.13, p19), a higher proportion than in the UK. 
People choosing to move to Norway who are 
economically active can access domestic social 
security benefits (a system not dissimilar to 
current UK arrangements).
EU withdrawal would also have a 
significant impact on UK nationals living in 
other EU/EEA countries. The UN estimated 
in 2015 (International migrant stock 2015, UN, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division)1 that there are 1.2m UK 
citizens living in other EU countries. In the 
same year, it was estimated (European Statistics 
Agency, 2015)2 that around 300,000 UK citizens 
were resident in Spain. DWP figures from 20153 
indicate that around 30 per cent of UK residents 
in Spain receive the UK state pension. Other 
EU countries with significant numbers of UK 
residents include Ireland (around 400,000), 
France (around 175,000) and Germany (around 
150,000) (Emigration from the UK, 2nd edn, 
Research Report 68, Home Office, November 
2012). In the event of a UK exit from the EU, 
member states would be free to introduce 
restrictions on entitlement to social security for 
UK nationals. It is possible that this could result 
in considerable numbers of citizens returning to 
the UK.
What happens if ‘remain’ wins?
In February 2016, the government renegotiated 
some elements of the UK’s membership of 
the EU. The government believes the new 
agreement will ‘make our benefits system 
less of a draw for EU citizens’ (Why the 
government believes that voting to remain in 
the EU is the best decision for the UK, 6 April 
2016). The ‘leave’ campaign describes the 
deal as an ‘omnishambles renegotiation’ (The 
government’s omnishambles renegotiation, 
Vote Leave, 2016). The implications for social 
security benefits centred on the so-called 
‘emergency brake’ mechanism, which would 
allow a member state to limit entitlement 
to in-work benefits for new EU migrants for 
up to four years (Explaining the EU deal: the 
‘emergency brake’, Full Fact, 22 February 2016).
The agreement allowed for ‘an initial complete 
exclusion but gradually increasing access to 
such benefits to take account of the growing 
connection of the worker with the labour 
market of the host member state’ (European 
Council conclusions, 18–19 February 2016, 
p23).4 This would be possible if it could be 
proved that there had been a significant influx 
of workers placing a strain on public services 
and the social security system. Legal opinion is 
split on whether the deal is legally binding (see, 
for example, Clive Coleman, ‘Is Cameron’s EU 
deal legally binding?’, BBC, 24 February 2016).5 
It is certainly true to say that the deal remains 
open to interpretation by the CJEU. It is difficult 
(but not impossible) to see how the CJEU could 
oppose the deal, given its compatibility with 
other EU treaties and the fact that it has the 
backing of the 28 nations of the EU council. 
It will be fascinating to observe how the 
referendum debate evolves in the run-up to 23 
June, and then to see how the social security 
system evolves in the coming years. m
1 www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/
migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml
2 See table, Population on 1 January by five year age 
group, sex and citizenship: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
data/database 
3 http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/sp/cccountry/
cat/ccgor/a_carate_r_cccountry_c_cat_p_ccgor_claimants_
living_abroad_aug15.html
4 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 
2016/02/19-euco-conclusions/
5 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-
referendum-35653495
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